America's North-West Frontier fantasy

Declan Walsh

July 24, 2007 11:30 AM

A perplexing twist in Washington's "war on terror" has occurred. For over two years the White House has stoutly defended the Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf's, record on combating Islamist extremism, even as a cyclone of Taliban terror ran through the tribal belt. But now, when Musharraf is finally starting to act - ordering the Red Mosque siege three weeks ago, deploying fresh troops to North West Frontier Province, and rallying Pakistan for a potential civil war against militants - Washington has suddenly decided he's not going fast enough. In fact it seems to be seriously considering war.

Six years after dropping troops into Afghanistan, Washington seems to believe it invaded the wrong country. A cascade of ever-tougher statements have created the impression that unilateral mlitary action against targets inside Pakistan is looming. First then the National Intelligence Estimate pinpointed the tribal areas as al-Qaida's global headquarters and warned that it was putting the US at risk. Then President Bush declared that Musharraf's efforts to broker peace in the same area had miserably failed. Finally his homeland security adviser, Fran Townsend, said that "no options are off the table" to solve the problem - including military action.

Trigger-happy Democrats chimed in enthusiastically. Whatever rock "those evil people" were hiding under, crowed the Senate Majority leader Harry Reid, "we should go get them".

It's not only politicians who are baying for bombs. A Washington Post editorial last week called for "targeted strikes or covert actions" inside Pakistan. The influential New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd declared she "had it up the Wazir with Waziristan" and called on a few good "Army Rangers or Navy Seals" to take care of business.

This sabre-rattling is ill-informed, dangerous and counter-productive. Certainly President Musharraf and his devious intelligence agencies have an ambiguous approach to the Taliban. But this must not be confused with the situation on the ground where, since the Red Mosque siege ended on July 11, Islamists have launched a blistering onslaught against government forces. The only thing guaranteed to rouse the fire-breathing mullahs even more is the prospect - however remote - of an American invasion.

And what would an American war in Waziristan look like? A full-scale invasion is unthinkable unless the US intends to topple Musharraf and create a second Iraq. They could go for targeted strikes - but in fact they already are. American Predator drones have been secretly hitting al-Qaida hideouts across the tribal areas for at least two years; to save itself political embarrassment Islamabad claims responsibility.

The military's last tactic is commando raids - a tactic the US has employed across the border in Afghanistan for the past six years with limited success. How would the same Special Forces, operating in a treacherous mountainous environment with hardly a friend, do any better in Waziristan?

Of course the rocket-propelled talk may be simply a ploy to make Musharraf push faster and harder against his troublesome tribesmen and their al-Qaida guests. If so, it's a risky gambit. At best the threats will deepen anti-Americanism and the perception that Musharraf is Bush's "poodle". At worst they will further destabilise the Pakistani state at an immensely fragile time. Musharraf is politically weak and his forces are at war in pockets of the Frontier. The suicide bombing - a device previously reserved for presidential assassination bids - has become a thrice-daily occurrence. No matter how much Washington exhorts him to "do more", Musharraf may reaching the limits of his power.

This is partly the Bush administration's own doing. Since 2001 it has propped up Musharraf with $10bn in aid and endless diplomatic cover-fire, free of cost. The price has been paid in terms of numerous distortions of politics and society - political alliances between Musharraf and the mullahs, a castrated parliament and, most recently, surging anti-military feeling. It was no coincidence that as triumphant lawyers tumbled out of the supreme court last Friday - after the victory of the chief justice, Muhammad Iftikhar Chaudhry, against Musharraf - that some also chanted anti-American slogans.

But even if Musharraf's sell-by date is approaching, American bombs are no solution. Success against bin Laden and his chums at their "terrorist mountain spa", as Ms Dowd puts it, is inextricably linked to solving the problems of the tribal areas themselves. The scheming tribesmen have survived on the outer margins of the Pakistani state since independence in 1947. Now, by whatever means possible - greater political freedoms, more schooling or just old-fashioned bribery - they must be brought into the fold. Few consider America a friend; but not all need to see it as the enemy.

Some American officials already know this. Before the latest hard talk they announced a $750m aid package for the tribal belt. The plan attracted some criticism, notably about tricky issues like corruption and finding projects that won't get blown up. But the broad alternative looks much worse. American military action in Pakistan now could plunge the country into turmoil, swamp its beleaguered democratic forces and fail to yield the terrorist scalps Washington is looking for. In fact it would likely create many more.